What is cyberterrorism? (ICSR)

 

Dr. Thomas Rid of the War Studies Department provides an overview of cyberterrorism, including

  • The disputed definition of cyberterrorism, which Rid defines as – “attacking critical infrastructure in the form of sabotage terrorizing people through the use of computer code.”
  • No militant groups have executed any cyberterrorism attacks, but such an attack may happen.
  • As of now, those who have the intent, do not have the capabilities, and those who have the capabilities, do not have the intent.
  • The only violent cyber attack has been Stuxnet.
  • The categories of cyber attacks (crime, espionage, subversion/hacktivism, sabotage)
  • In order to execute a cyberterrorism attack, the party must have sufficient target intelligence and engineering skills.

 

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

 

“The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime applies all elements of national power to protect citizens and U.S. national security interests from the convergence of 21st century transnational criminal threats. This Strategy is organized around a single unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security—and to urge our foreign partners to do the same. The end-state we seek is to reduce transnational organized crime (TOC) from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world. The Strategy will achieve this end-state by pursuing five key policy objectives:

  1. Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, and exploitation of transnational criminal networks.
  2. Help partner countries strengthen governance and transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances.
  3. Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system from TOC penetration and abuse.
  4. Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures, depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the criminal facilitation of terrorist activities.
  5. Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and public-private partnerships to defeat transnational organized crime.

The Strategy also introduces new and innovative capabilities and tools, which will be accomplished by prioritizing within the resources available to affected departments and agencies.

A new Executive Order will establish a sanctions program to block the property of and prohibit transactions with significant transnational criminal networks that threaten national security, foreign policy, or economic interests.

A proposed legislative package will enhance the authorities available to investigate, interdict, and prosecute the activities of top transnational criminal networks.

A new Presidential Proclamation under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) will deny entry to transnational criminal aliens and others who have been targeted for financial sanctions.

A new rewards program will replicate the success of narcotics rewards programs in obtaining information that leads to the arrest and conviction of the leaders of transnational criminal organizations that pose the greatest threats to national security.

An interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group will identify those TOC networks that present a sufficiently high national security risk and will ensure the coordination of all elements of national power to combat them.”

 

See the official strategy at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf

See the NSC Press Release at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime

 

A Proportional Response? North Korean Internet Jammed

North Korea’s internet has become jammed because of a possible DDoS attack in response to DPRK’s alleged involvement in the Sony Hack. As of December 22, 2014, the entire DPRK routing system through China has gone dark. This incident may be President Obama’s proportional response to the Sony hack.

NK Internet Traffic Jammed

NK Internet Traffic Jammed

Estes, Adam Clark. “North Korea’s Internet Is Totally Screwed Right Now.” Gizmodo. December 22, 2014.

Fung, Brian. “North Korea’s Internet is going suspiciously haywire.” WaPo. December 22, 2014.

Kleinman, Alexis. “North Korea’s Internet Might Be Under Attack.” HP. December 22, 2014.

North Korea Tech. “North Korea’s Internet link is flaky today.” December 22, 2014.

Perlroth, Nicole and David E. Sanger. “Attack Is Suspected as North Korean Internet Collapses.” NYT. December 22, 2014.

Robertson, Jordan. “North Korean Internet Goes Dark in Wake of Sony Hack.” Bloomberg. December 22, 2014.

OSINT – DEA FAST Teams

 

Drug Enforcement Administration Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team

5 Deployable Teams

Mission Statement: “Plan and conduct special enforcement operations; train, mentor, and advise foreign narcotics law enforcement units; collect and assess evidence and intelligence in support of US and bilateral investigations.”

The major need for this organization is that FTOs and DTOs overlap, in that FTOs provide an ideological motivation for violence, while DTOs provide monetary support for violence – many members are interchangeable between FTOs and DTOs, particularly in weak states such as Afghanistan with opium smuggling and warlordism.

FAST Training Supported by SOCOM

Phase 1: Physical & Tactical Assessment

Phase 2: Specialized Training

Phase 3: Advanced SOF TTPs

TTPs include: Mission Planning; Small Unit Tactics; Heavy/Foreign Weapons; Close Quarter Combat Shooting; IED and Demolitions Familiarization; Surveillance Detection; Counter-Threat Driving; Combat Lifesaving; Communication and NVG; Land Warfare; MOUT/SOUC; Escape and Evade Techniques; Airmobile/Maritime Operations; Convoy Operations; Counterdrug Tactical Police OperationsDEA Strategy & Mechanism

DEA Strategy and Mechanism

1. Identify and Target HVT’s and key nexus nodes
Use informants, UC operations, interdiction operations, financial investigations, and telephone intercepts to develop prosecutable Afghan Bi-lateral, 959, and 960a cases.

2. Synchronize and Conduct Operations with US/ISAF SOF

Transparent and shared targets, intelligence, investigative priorities, and resources throughout theatre.

3. Capacity Building
DEA expansion and integration into ISAF Regional Commands. Continue to train, mentor, and advise specialized units of the CNP-A.

4. Strategic Communications
Impact local Afghan mindset by enforcing rule of law, support Afghan-led operations, targeting corrupt officials and high-level insurgents & traffickers, and sustain dialog with tribal elders.

FORECAST:
1. More DTO/FTO hybrids will appear: 21stCentury OC
2. FARC is thecase study
3. DTO/FTO’s operate in same spaces
4. Each vying for same money generated from same illicit enterprises
5. Reliance on same shadow facilitators for logistics, finance, $, arms
6. RED forces in compressed ‘space/time’ scenario become allies

Is it a law enforcement mission or is it a military mission?
Both!!!—U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Military, and the Intelligence Community have no choice but to work closer together.
GREEN and BLUE forces must have unity of effort to prevail

DEA FAST Unit Insignia

DEA FAST Unit Insignia

ABC News: http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=8366287 Fast Alpha Patch

Drug Enforcement Administration. Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team. DEA FAST. NDIA SO/LIC Symposium. Richard Dobrich. www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011SOLIC/Tues2Dobrich.pdf

DEA. “FAST.” http://searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search?q=site%3Awww.dea.gov&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&output=xml_no_dtd&ie=iso-8859-1&oe=UTF-8&client=default_frontend&proxystylesheet=dea&site=default_collection&q=FAST&btnG=

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/DEA-FAST-Team/197574533675227

NYT: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/world/americas/united-states-drug-enforcement-agency-squads-extend-reach-of-drug-war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

SIGAR Audit Reports: http://www.sigar.mil/audits/auditreports/index.aspx?SSR=2&SubSSR=11&WP=Audit%20Reports